"The number of export-restriction measures on industrial raw materials globally has risen from 193 in 2009 to 507 in 2023." [507]
The near-tripling of export restrictions globally quantifies the growing coercive environment against which non-binding MOUs are being tested, directly supporting the claim that the current diplomatic toolkit is structurally mismatched to the threat.
Reasoning from this article
The KIEP analysis cited in the article identifies a structural mismatch: the tools allied governments use for mineral cooperation (MOUs, FTAs, stockpiling) are non-enforceable precisely when enforcement matters most — during active export restrictions. The near-tripling of global export restriction measures since 2009 shows this is a worsening systemic trend, not a bilateral anomaly. The same gap between diplomatic instruments and enforceable supply security applies to any allied nation relying on similar cooperation frameworks.