"ASML and Tokyo Electron are still able to service advanced lithography, deposition, and etching tools in Chinese fabs known to be producing advanced-node semiconductors" [ASML]
This quote identifies the specific gap: allied firms servicing the exact equipment categories that US firms are prohibited from servicing, directly evidencing the competitive asymmetry and control incompleteness the signal describes.
Reasoning from this article
The article quantifies the commercial stakes (up to 25% of company income from China servicing) and explains that ASML and TEL maintain permanent on-site staff in Chinese fabs, meaning the controls gap is not marginal but central to whether advanced-node Chinese chipmaking can continue. This dynamic — where the lead country imposes controls but allies free-ride commercially while undermining the strategic objective — is a recurring structural problem in multilateral technology denial regimes, from CoCom to present-day semiconductor controls.