"Merz pointed to the Plaza Accords as an example of how such matters could be addressed." [Plaza Accords]
""subsidising overcapacities" along with a "currency that isn't convertible freely … is not acceptable"" [currency that isn't convertible freely]
Germany has historically been the EU's most China-accommodating major economy due to deep automotive and industrial export ties; Merz's explicit Plaza Accord framing marks a structural break from that posture. The Plaza Accord precedent is significant because it was a G5 coordinated intervention, implying Merz is signalling openness to US-EU-Japan alignment against Chinese currency policy. Combined with the overcapacity and subsidy framing, this suggests Europe is building a multi-instrument pressure architecture — tariffs, subsidies countermeasures, and now currency — that mirrors the US approach. The generalisable dynamic is: as Chinese export surges threaten European industrial bases, even historically accommodating states shift toward coercive economic statecraft.
Historically, Western trade complaints against China focused on goods-level subsidies, dumping, and IP theft; currency undervaluation was acknowledged but rarely operationalised as a formal grievance in EU policy. Merz's framing treats non-convertibility as a structural market-access barrier equivalent to subsidies, which opens a legal and political pathway to currency-linked countermeasures or WTO challenges. This dynamic is generalisable: as bilateral deficits widen and domestic manufacturers lobby harder, the set of practices labelled 'unacceptable' expands, ratcheting up the scope of potential retaliation.