"the large container ship MSC Qingdao forced its way through after closure using the southern channel, followed by two Sinokor VLCCs" [MSC Qingdao]
Multiple commercial vessels from different operators defying the IRGC closure order in real time directly evidences the structural claim that unilateral chokepoint closure is difficult to enforce against economically motivated actors.
Reasoning from this article
The article records at least five distinct defiance events: MSC Qingdao, two Sinokor VLCCs, three Saudi Bahri tankers with AIS off, and South Korean/Emirati tankers using the Oman channel. The diversity of actors — European, Korean, Saudi, Chinese-operated — suggests this is not a single state's calculated defiance but a market-driven collective action problem for Iran. This generalizes to a broader structural dynamic: as global trade volumes and ship values rise, the economic cost of compliance with unilateral closure orders increases, making enforcement by sub-great-power states progressively harder without kinetic interdiction.