"disagreements – including on Iran's control of Hormuz and its support for regional proxies, like the Houthi rebels in Yemen and Hezbollah in Lebanon" [Houthi rebels in Yemen]
The enumeration of three distinct, structurally separate dispute categories — chokepoint control, nuclear ambitions, and proxy networks — directly evidences why no single negotiating session or military strike can produce resolution.
Reasoning from this article
The article illustrates a recurring structural trap: when a state's strategic value rests on multiple simultaneous leverage points (nuclear capability, chokepoint geography, proxy armies), a counterparty demanding all be surrendered simultaneously faces an adversary with no rational incentive to comply. This multi-front deadlock pattern generalizes to other cases where a regional power's deterrence architecture is layered — dismantling one layer increases the salience of others, making comprehensive deals structurally harder than sequential or partial agreements.