"many Chinese firms operate outside this norm, often selling at or below cost. Their secret lies in high-turnover sales." [high-turnover sales]
"taxes are collected based on the bookkeeping turnover of corporate production. If taxes were levied on true profits, fiscal revenue would be significantly lower" [bookkeeping turnover]
The article generalizes from real estate collapse to NEVs to food production, showing the volume-driven survival model is sector-agnostic. This means the fragility is not a sectoral problem but an economy-wide architectural flaw: the entire industrial base is leveraged against continuous demand expansion. The real estate implosion serves as a proof-of-concept for what happens when incremental growth stops in any sector. This dynamic is structurally distinct from Western cyclical recessions and implies China's minimum viable growth rate is structurally higher than peer economies.
This is not merely a Chinese accounting quirk — it reflects a broader pattern where industrial policy that incentivizes scale over margin eventually corrupts the fiscal data governments rely on for planning. The article frames local government fiscal pressure as a 'precursor' rather than the crisis itself, implying the revenue cliff has not yet been fully realized. Any economy that has pursued export-volume-led industrialization under similar incentive structures faces analogous hidden fiscal exposure.